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Abstract
Although recent research shows that the euro has spurred cross-border nancial integration,
the exact mechanisms remain unknown. We investigate the underlying channels of the euro’s
eect on nancial integration using data on bilateral banking linkages among twenty industrial
countries in the past thirty years. We also construct a dataset that records the timing of
legislative-regulatory harmonization policies in nancial services across the European Union.
We nd that the euro’s impact on nancial integration is primarily driven by eliminating the
currency risk. Legislative-regulatory convergence has also contributed to the spur of cross-border
nancial transactions. Trade in goods, while highly correlated with bilateral nancial activities,
does not play a key role in explaining the euro’s positive eect on nancial integration.
Keywords: Financial integration; Law and nance; Euro; European Union; FSAP; Trade;
Regulation
JEL Codes: F1; F3; G2; K05
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1216
June 2010
Executive summary 
The introduction of the euro has been one of the most important policy experiments in the 
international arena. There has been extensive research that tries to quantify the impact of the 
euro on trade, conduct of monetary policy, and financial integration. Although researchers 
generally find positive effects of the euro on these various outcomes, the usual identification 
problem remains. The main issue here is that there have been numerous policy changes and 
reforms coinciding with the introduction of the euro, so it is difficult to distinguish the direct 
impact of the euro on any outcome. 
We try to identify the impact of the euro on financial integration. It is important to know 
whether the euro has an impact on financial integration, and if so, its size and causal 
mechanism. The answers to all these questions are important for a number of policy reasons. 
First, the euro may enhance total welfare of firms and households through financial deepening 
by allowing consumption smoothing, enabling risk sharing, and promoting long-standing 
productivity growth. Second, the international role of the single currency and its global role 
vis-à-vis the dollar strongly depend on the ability of the euro area countries to develop deep 
and liquid financial markets. Third, financial integration may in turn promote international 
specialisation and enable countries to reap benefits from enhanced productivity as a result. 
One advantage of our empirical analysis over the existing literature comes from our utilisation 
of a rich confidential panel data set on bilateral financial linkages. Our data cover the past 
three decades and thus, we have significant “before euro” and “after euro” observations and 
variation. This data set not only helps us better identify the euro’s impact on financial 
integration, it also allows us to investigate the exact channels through which the euro affects 
financial integration. Specifically, we explore the effect of three such channels: elimination of 
the exchange-rate risk among the euro area economies, simultaneous legal-regulatory reforms 
in financial sector, and increased trade volume as a result of the euro.  
We start our analysis quantifying the total effect of the single currency on cross-border 
financial integration. We estimate difference-in-difference specifications that compare the 
"within" country-pair impact of the single currency among the twelve initial euro area 
member countries (the treatment group) with the general evolution of banking activities 
across the control group of economies (that consists of other EU and non-EU industrial 
countries). Our results suggest that following the adoption of the euro bilateral bank holdings 
and transactions increased by roughly 40% among the euro area countries. We obtain similar, 
though somewhat smaller estimates in the range of 25%-30%, when we compare the increase 
in banking integration in the twelve countries that first adopted the euro with the three EU15 
nations that have not joined the currency union. Both estimates, although highly significant, 
are much lower than the ones found in previous studies examining the impact of the single 
currency on various types of capital flows/holdings. This illustrates that failing to account for 
country-pair fixed-effects and global trends can lead to inflated estimates, due to omitted-
variable bias. 
After quantifying the total effect of the euro we turn to the main focus of our analysis and 
investigate the roots of this impact. First, we explore the impact of reducing currency risk and 
eliminating exchange rate fluctuations among the euro area countries. Among policy circles 
this was always considered to be the main channel of the euro's impact on financial 
integration and trade. To isolate the effect of the nature of the currency regime from other 
policies and developments, we use the recent update of the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
exchange rate regime classification and construct time-varying measures of the flexibility of 
bilateral exchange rates. Our panel specifications show that the euro's positive effect is mainly 
driven by elimination of the currency risk. 6
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Second, we examine the impact of legislative harmonization policies in financial services. 
Acknowledging that legal, regulatory, and supervisory differences in financial markets are 
significant impediments to the full integration of capital markets, the EU countries 
implemented various reforms in banking, insurance, and equity markets over the past decade. 
Most of these measures were under the umbrella of the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP), an ambitious initiative launched by the EU Commission and the EU Council in the 
late 1990s aiming to harmonize the functioning of financial intermediaries. The most 
important policies of the FSAP were detailed into a set of EU-level laws, the Directives and 
the Regulations. Among others, the FSAP included new legislation on cross-border M&A 
activity of financial institutions, money laundering, transparency in capital markets, investor 
protection, and supervision. 
To assess the impact of financial reforms on banking integration, we use information from the 
EU Commission and each of the EU-15 countries and build a new dataset on the 
implementation of the 27 Directives of the FSAP across member states. In contrast to 
Regulations that become immediately enforceable across the EU, the Directives are 
legislative acts that require from member states to achieve some well-specified results, but 
without clearly dictating the means. Most importantly, the EU countries have discretion in the 
timing of the transposition of the Directives into the domestic legal order. Governments 
usually delay the transposition of the Directives to national law for various reasons such as 
technical difficulties in transposing the directives into national law and protecting domestic 
interests. Hence, the transposition of the Directives takes in practice several years and differs 
considerably across the EU. As a result, we have significant variation in the adoption time of 
the 27 legislative acts incorporated in the FSAP. 
After constructing this new dataset, we estimate the effects of legislative convergence in the 
regulation of banking, insurance, company law, and capital markets supervision on financial 
integration. Our estimates indicate that cross-border banking activities increased significantly 
among European countries that quickly adopted the financial services Directives of the FSAP. 
This result contributes to the law and finance literature, which emphasizes the importance of 
contracting institutions in shaping financial patterns. To our knowledge, this finding is the 
first result linking bilateral legislative harmonization to cross-border financial integration. 
However, although financial services legislative harmonization is a significant driver of 
banking integration, it cannot explain the total effect of the euro on its own. One explanation 
might be that the FSAP Directives have not been fully enforced across. 
Finally, we investigate whether the spur in cross-border banking integration is driven by an 
increased volume of transactions in international trade. As goods and asset trade move in 
tandem and currency unions raise bilateral trade, the positive impact of the single currency on 
financial integration may partly at least be coming from goods trade. Although there is a 
strong correlation between banking activities and international trade, trade cannot explain a 
significant part of the effect of the euro on financial integration. 
European policy makers hoped that by promoting financial (and trade) integration, the single 
currency could spur welfare by speeding productivity growth, lowering consumption 
volatility, and enabling risk-sharing. On the other hand, cross-border financial linkages have 
been at the core of the transmission of the ongoing crisis that has quickly spread from the US 
to other economies. Understanding the impact of the single European currency on financial 
integration and the underlying mechanisms is therefore crucial for designing the new rules of 
the game for global financial markets. Our analysis suggests that the euro has been a major 
force in driving financial integration mainly because foreign investors have a strong 
preference for currency stability. We also find that legal-regulatory harmonisation policies in 
financial services have contributed crucially to the deepening of European financial markets. 
This result not only offers support to European policy makers who are currently considering 
further harmonisation of the regulation of capital markets and banks across Europe. 7
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The introduction of the single European currency has been one of the most important developments
in the international markets over the past century. The sixteen European countries that have so far
abandoned their national monies and adopted the euro did so expecting that monetary union and
the accompanying integration policies would shield their economies from adverse shocks, smooth
consumption, and promote non-in ationary growth. On its tenth anniversary, the debate on the
costs and benets of the euro is as intense as ever.
Given the di!culty of measuring the growth benets of the euro with limited time-series data,
the literature has focused on quantifying the eects of the euro on goods trade (see Rose (2009),
and Baldwin (2006) for surveys). Examining the eect of the single currency not only on trade,
but also on nancial integration is fundamental as the free movement of capital across borders is
a key prerequisite for the functioning of a currency area (Mundell (1961)). Thus, following the
construction of new datasets on cross-border investment for a large number of countries (CPIS
data from the IMF), recent studies examine the euro’s impact on international capital  ows (see
Lane (2006b, 2009) and Papaioannou and Portes (2009, 2010) for reviews).1 These studies augment
an otherwise standard gravity equation of nancial holdings/ ows with an indicator variable that
takes on the value one when the two countries are members of the euro area (and zero otherwise).
This approach is certainly the natural rst step in analyzing whether nancial integration is higher
among the euro area countries compared to other economies. Yet, this approach does not identify
the sources of the euro’s eect on nancial integration. As Baldwin (2006) forcefully emphasizes in
the similar context of the euro’s impact on goods trade, it is vital that we investigate the underlying
roots of this eect. For example, is the documented positive eect of the euro on nancial integration
driven by elimination of the currency risk among member countries? Or is it an outcome of various
nancial sector legislative-regulatory reforms that European countries undertook simultaneously
with the euro’s introduction? What if the positive eect of the euro on nancial integration is
simply due to increased goods trade?
1Lane (2006a) and Coeurdacier and Martin (2009) estimate that the monetary union increased cross-border bond
holdings among the euro area countries by 230% and 150% respectively. Similarly Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008),
Coeurdacier and Martin (2009), and De Santis and Gerard (2006), among others, document that the euro has increased
international equity investment among member states by as much as 150%. In the same vein, Spiegel (2009a,b) nds
that cross-border bank lending increased three-fold in Portugal and Greece after the euro’s introduction. Blank and
Buch (2007) nd a positive and signicant increase in intra-euro area nancial linkages following the introduction of
the euro.8
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In this paper, we address these questions, which were overlooked by the aforementioned studies
that investigate the eect of the euro on nancial integration. Our main contribution is to identify
the sources of the euro’s impact on nancial integration.2 We do so exploiting a unique (conden-
tial) dataset from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) that reports bilateral cross-border
bank assets and liabilities for twenty advanced economies over the past thirty years. Although our
focus is primarily in understanding the underlying mechanisms on euro’s impact on nancial inte-
gration, the rich panel structure allows us to perform a comprehensive before-after analysis of the
impact of the single currency on cross-border integration accounting for time-invariant country-pair
characteristics and global trends. This is important since due to data limitations most previous
studies employed cross-sectional approaches.3 A natural concern with the cross-sectional estimates
in the literature is that they might re ect hard-to-account-for and unobserved country-pair factors
that are both correlated with the euro and nancial integration. Accounting for such factors is
essential, as recent studies show that information asymmetries, distrust and cultural dissimilarities
are signicant determinants of cross-border investment (e.g. Portes and Rey (2005), Portes et al.
(2001), Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), Guiso et al. (2009), Ekinci et al. (2008); Buch (2003);
Giannetti and Yafeh (2008); Mian (2006); Buch, Driscoll, and Ostergaard (2009)).4
Thus before we analyze the sources of euro’s impact, we start our analysis quantifying the
total eect of the single currency on cross-border nancial integration. We estimate dierence-
in-dierence specications that compare the "within" country-pair impact of the single currency
among the twelve initial euro area member countries (the treatment group) with the general evo-
lution of banking activities across the control group of economies (that consists of other EU and
non-EU industrial countries). Our results suggest that, following the adoption of the euro, cross-
border bilateral bank holdings and transactions increased by roughly 40% among the euro area
countries. We obtain similar, though somewhat smaller estimates in the range of 25%  30%,
when we compare the increase in banking integration in the twelve countries that rst adopted
2In recent work Hale and Spiegel (2009) also investigate the sources of the euro eect using disaggregated rm-level
data on bond issuance before and after the euro. They nd that after the introduction of the single currency an
increased number of mostly non-nancial rms issued euro denominated securities.
3A notable exception is the study by Blank and Buch (2007), who also also report “within” estimates controlling
for country-pair xed-eects. However their study does not aim to identify the underlying channels of the euro’s
positive impact on cross-border investment, which is the main question we pursue in this paper.
4The parallel literature that assesses the impact of currency unions on trade shows that accounting for country-
pair unobservables is fundamental. For example while cross-sectional (“between”) studies document that the euro’s
impact on trade was as large as 200%, the average xed-eect (“within”) estimates falls to 8%312% (see Rose (2009)
and Baldwin (2006)).9
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the euro with the three EU15 nations that have not joined the currency union. Both estimates,
although highly signicant, are much lower than the ones found in previous studies examining the
impact of the single currency on various types of capital  ows/holdings. This illustrates that failing
to account for country-pair xed-eects and global trends can lead to in ated estimates, due to
omitted-variable bias.
After quantifying the total eect of the euro we turn to the main focus of our analysis and
investigate the roots of this impact. First, we explore the impact of reducing currency risk and
eliminating exchange rate  uctuations among the euro area countries. Among policy circles this was
always considered to be the main channel of the euro’s impact on nancial integration and trade.
To isolate the eect of the nature of the currency regime from other policies and developments, we
use the recent update of the Reinhart and Rogo (2004) exchange rate regime classication (from
Ilzetzki et al. (2008)) and construct time-varying measures of the  exibility of bilateral exchange
rates. This allows us to control for the fall in the exchange rate volatility among the EU currencies
in the 1990s before the euro’s adoption, when the EU countries joined the exchange rate mechanism
(ERMII). Our panel specications show that international banking activities increase signicantly
among pairs of countries that adopt hard pegs. Most importantly for our focus, once we control
for the nature of the exchange rate regime, the indicator variable that switches to one after 1999
for the euro area countries drops signicantly compared to the unconditional specications; in
addition, in most permutations it becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. This illustrates
that the euro’s positive eect is mainly driven by elimination of the currency risk. This result is
also interesting in the light of the so-called "fear of  oating" literature, which argues that due to
commitment issues, developing countries are unwilling to let their currencies  oat (e.g. Calvo and
Reinhart (2002); Gelos and Wei (2005)). Our results contribute to this body of work by showing a
similar pattern among industrial economies.
Second, we examine the impact of legislative harmonization policies in nancial services. Ac-
knowledging that legal, regulatory, and supervisory dierences in nancial markets are signicant
impediments to the full integration of capital markets, the EU countries implemented various re-
forms in banking, insurance, and equity markets over the past decade. Most of these measures
were under the umbrella of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), an ambitious initiative
launched by the EU Commission and the EU Council in the late 1990s aiming to harmonize the
functioning of nancial intermediaries. The most important policies of the FSAP were detailed into
a set of EU-level laws, the Directives and the Regulations. Among others, the FSAP included new
legislation on cross-border M&A activity of nancial institutions, money laundering, transparency10
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in capital markets, investor protection, and supervision (see Table 1 and Supplementary Appendix
Table A).
To assess the impact of nancial reforms on banking integration, we use information from the
EU Commission and each of the EU-15 countries and build a new dataset on the implementation of
the 27 Directives of the FSAP across member states (see Table 2). In contrast to Regulations that
become immediately enforceable across the EU, the Directives are legislative acts that require from
member states to achieve some well-specied results, but without clearly dictating the means. Most
importantly, the EU countries have discretion in the timing of the transposition of the Directives
into the domestic legal order. Governments usually delay the transposition of the Directives to
national law for various reasons such as technical di!culties in transposing the directives into
national law and protecting domestic interests. Hence, the transposition of the Directives takes
in practice several years and diers considerably across the EU. As a result, we have signicant
variation in the adoption time of the 27 legislative acts incorporated in the FSAP.
After constructing this new dataset, we estimate the eects of legislative convergence in the
regulation of banking, insurance, company law, and capital markets supervision on nancial inte-
gration. Our estimates indicate that cross-border banking activities increased signicantly among
European countries that quickly adopted the nancial services Directives of the FSAP. This result
contributes to the law and nance literature (La Porta et al. (1997), (1998)), which emphasizes the
importance of contracting institutions in shaping nancial patterns. To our knowledge, this nding
is the rst result linking bilateral legislative harmonization to cross-border nancial integration.
However, although nancial services legislative harmonization is a signicant driver of banking in-
tegration, it cannot explain the total eect of the euro on its own. One explanation might be that
the FSAP Directives have not been fully enforced across Europe (see Enriques and Gatti (2007)).
Finally, we investigate whether the spur in cross-border banking integration is driven by an
increased volume of transactions in international trade. As goods and asset trade move in tandem
(e.g. Obstfeld and Rogo (2000); Rose and Spiegel (2004); Rose (2005); Aviat and Coeurdacier
(2007)) and currency unions raise bilateral trade (e.g. Rose (2000, 2009)), the positive impact
of the single currency on nancial integration may partly at least be coming from goods trade.
Although there is a strong "within" correlation between banking activities and international trade,
trade cannot explain a signicant part of the eect of the euro on nancial integration.
Besides our contribution to the literature on the impact of the single European currency on
nancial integration and how this impact works, our work relates to the broader literature that11
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examines the determinants of international capital  ows. Empirical studies by Wei (2000), Alfaro et
al. (2008), Papaioannou (2009) and others show that institutions – broadly dened – are impor-
tant determinants of all types of international capital  ows. Our ndings that legal and regulatory
harmonization in nancial services is strongly associated to international movements illustrates
that dierences in institutions (broadly dened) and the transparency in governance of nancial
intermediaries are important factors explaining capital  ows and the lack of international diversi-
cation. Our results further show that, besides institutional frictions, a crucial factor explaining the
lack of international diversication is currency risk (see also Gelos and Wei (2005)).
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the empirical specication
and explain in detail our data. Section 3 gives our estimates on the total eect of the euro, and
presents our analysis on the impact of the three aforementioned channels for the impact of the euro
on nancial integration. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Specication and Data
2.1 Specication
Our baseline specication takes the following form:
ELl>m>w = l>m + w + #1HX1l>m>w + #2HX2l>m>w + #3H]1l>m>w + #4H]2l>m>w + [0
l>m>w + yl>m>w
The dependent variable (EL) is the average of the log of real bilateral assets and liabilities holdings
(or gross  ows) of countries l and m in year w, standardized by the sum of the two countries’ popula-
tion. We construct EL using data on cross-border banking activities from the condential version
of BIS’s International Locational Banking Statistics Database that reports bilateral positions. We
extract from this dataset bilateral stocks and  ows covering twenty industrialized countries over the
period 1977  2007.5 Our data covers all the twelve initial euro area countries (Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Greece, Luxemburg, France, Finland, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy),
plus the three EU15 non-euro area countries (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom), and
Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States.6
5The Locational Banking Statistics nowadays covers data from roughly forty countries; yet half of these countries
started reporting only recently (mostly after 2000) or are “o-shore” centers. Therefore, we only analyze the twenty
industrialized countries that appear in the BIS dataset since 1970s.
6Thus the maximum number of observations are 5>700 (20 W 19 W 30@2). Usually bilateral asset and goods trade
data contain many zeros that make the logarithmic transformation questionable. Our focus on industrial countries12
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Our focus is on the coe!cient of the H]2l>m>w variable that takes on the value one if both countries
are members of the eurozone in year w and zero otherwise. To isolate the eect of the single currency
from an EU-wide eect, we include in the specication a dummy variable that equals one if the
two countries are members of the EU in year w and zero otherwise (HX2l>m>w). In all specications
we also control for the unilateral eects of the EU and the euro on banking integration, adding
indicator variables that take on the value one when only one of the two countries is a member of
the EU or the euro zone in a given year (HX1l>m>w and H]1l>m>w respectively).
The three dimensional panel structure allows us to control for year xed-eects (w)a n d( m o r e
importantly) country-pair xed-eects (l>m). Year xed-eects account for global trends on bank-
ing integration (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008)), that might be re ected by the euro variable
if not controlled for. Country-pair xed-eects control for all time-invariant bilateral characteris-
tics, such as trust, culture, information asymmetries that aect nancial patterns. Our empirical
model constitutes a dierence-in-dierence specication, where the euro area member countries are
the "treatment" group, while the three EU and the ve non-EU countries serve as the "control"
group(s). Since we include both time and country-pair xed-eects the coe!cients on the indi-
cator variables measure the eect of the EU and the euro membership on banking integration of
the participating countries compared to evolution of international banking integration in the other
industrial economies.
Vector [0
l>m>w includes other independent and control variables, such as trade, the  exibility of
the exchange rate regime and legal-regulatory harmonization, which are explained in detail below.
2.2 Data
Dependent variable
The BIS Locational Banking Statistics database covers all of banks’ on-balance sheet exposure, as
well as some "o-balance sheet" items. The dataset reports asset and liability holdings of banks
located in the main industrial countries ("the reporting area") against more than 100 economies
(the "vis-à-vis area") since the end of 1977. The data includes mainly cross-border bank-to-bank
lending activities, such as foreign loans, deposits and long-term debt placed with non-resident
makes our analysis immune to this problem, because we miss just a few observations and only in the beginning of
the sample. Our baseline models are estimated in a sample of 5>566 observations. Most gaps involve Greece and
Portugal. We thus re-estimated all models dropping these two countries. The results are similar.13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1216
June 2010
banks, including bank’s own related o!ces abroad and subsidiaries.7 T h ed a t aa l s oc o v e r st r a d e -
related credit, and holdings of debt securities issued mainly by other banks, and participations of
equity and FDI. Yet, BIS documentations suggests that equity portfolio was, until recently, a small
fraction of international banking activities (see BIS (2003a,b) and Wooldridge (2002)).8
Quite importantly domestic monetary authorities report to the BIS the currency exposure
of local banking institutions. Using this information the BIS experts can estimate cross-border
 ows accounting for valuation eects that occur due to exchange rate swings. As the BIS (2003a)
documents " ows are estimated by the BIS sta as the exchange rate adjusted changes in holdings."
Although from an international diversication standpoint studying stocks is more appropriate,  ows
account for valuation eects are also important and thus we opt for using both measures.9
The data is originally expressed in current U.S. dollars. After de ating the series with the U.S.
price index, we construct two measures of banking integration, one based on stocks and one based
on gross  ows. EL1l>m>w is the average of the log of real bilateral assets and liabilities holdings of
countries l and m in each year, standardized by the sum of the two countries’ population. EL2l>m>w
is the average of the log of real bilateral assets and liabilities gross  ows, standardized by the sum
of the two countries’ population in year w.10
Exchange rate regime
To investigate the impact of currency risk we augment our main specication with a bilateral time-
varying measure that re ects the  exibility of the exchange rate regime (HUl>m>w). We do so using
7T h i si st h em a i nd i erence with the similar BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics Database, used for example by
Spiegel (2009a,b). However, Spiegel measures the impact of the euro only for Greece and Portugal.
8Unfortunately the database does not distinguish between FDI, portfolio and xed-income investments, and stan-
dard bank-to-bank loans and credit lines.
9de Santis and Gerard (2006) and Buch, Driscoll, and Ostergaard (2009) take a more “structural” approach than
we do and compare the actual investment holdings of foreign investors and banks respectively to what an international
mean-variance model predicts. While this approach has the obvious benet of imposing some structure in the empirical
analysis it is far from clear than international banks follow simple global mean-variance strategies. For example the
corporate nance literature shows that due to monitoring costs and asymmetric information banks tend to lend to
proximate borrowers. Moreover since our data includes investment in both debt and equity instruments it is not clear
how one could estimate expected international returns.
10We also experiment with other measures of banking integration. First, following Rose and Spiegel (2004) we
didn’t standardize the variables with population (and controlled for the product of log population). Second, following
early works on trade we used the log of the average (and alternatively the sum) of bilateral holdings and gross  ows
(see Baldwin (2006) for a critique of this measure). The results are similar and hence not reported for brevity.14
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the latest update of the Reinhart and Rogo (2004) exchange rate regime classication (by Ilzetzki,
Reinhart and Rogo (2008)). Using data on o!cial and dual (parallel and black) foreign exchange
markets, Reinhart and Rogo (2004) produce two (de facto)c l a s s i cations of the exchange rate
regime at a monthly frequency from 1946 till the end of 2007.11 The "coarse" index distinguishes
between four regimes, xed (score of 1), crawling pegs (score of 2), managed  oating (score of 3),
and free  oating (score of 4).12 The "ne" grid ranges from 1, indicating a xed-exchange rate
regime (such as the euro), till 13, suggesting a freely  oating exchange rate.13 For our benchmark
estimates we prefer the "ne" classication, as it exhibits larger variation and is less correlated
with the binary euro area measure (H]2) that we also include in many specications. We also
show results with the "coarse" classication for robustness. For both classications, we construct
a bilateral measure of exchange rate  exibility by taking the sum of the log of the scores for each




l>w )+l n ( HU
i>f
m>w ) where
superscript i and f indicate the ne and the coarse classication).
Legislative harmonization
The introduction of the euro was accompanied by legislative reforms in nancial services. To
isolate the impact of these policies we use information from the European Commission and the
EU-15 Member States on the implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and
construct a new dataset that measures the degree of legislative harmonization in nancial services
across European countries.14
11It should be stressed that in our sample of developed economies there are no major black or parallel currency
markets. Thus in our group of economies the index is to great extent de jure as it re ects the choice of monetary
authorities to peg their currencies.
12T h e r ei sa l s oafth category, free falling, that includes hyperin ation currencies. Yet none of the 20 industrialized
countries we consider is ever placed in this category.
13For example, for most years the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Australian dollar get a score around
11 3 13. The Swiss franc ranges from 8 to 12, while the Canadian dollar  uctuates around 8.T h e v a r i a t i o n i n
European countries is substantial. In general, European currencies appear in intermediate status for most of the
1980s (in the range of 4 to 8); in the early 1990s the majority of countries move to a xed-regime range (score of 4),
a n dt oaf u l l y - xed regime (score of 1) for the ones that join the euro in 1999. The Deutsche mark is classied as a
free  oating currency (score of 13) till 1998.
14Besides legal harmonization in nancial services the introduction of the single currency was accompanied by a se-
ries of technical/infrastructure reforms. For example with the introduction of TARGET (Trans-European Automated
Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system) payments between credit institutions within the euro-area take
place in real-time and at a harmonized transaction fee. At the same time the number of payment systems was
reduced from seventeen to six in 1999. Other important infrastructure innovations included the introduction of the15
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The FSAP was a major 5-year program launched by the European Union in the end of 1998
with the aim to establish: (1) a single EU wholesale market for nancial services, (2) open and
secure retail markets, and (3) state-of-the-art prudential and supervisory regulations. The project
included 42 measures that aimed to create a harmonized EU market for banking, securities and
insurance. The most important part of the project consisted of (27) EU-level legislative acts (the
Directives) and (2) Regulations. The other measures were Communications and Recommendations
of the Commission with the member states on technical issues.
Until its o!cial completion at the end of 2003, the EU legislative bodies (the EU Council and
the European Parliament with the assistance of the EU Commission) passed most of the initially
planned measures. In particular, the EU bodies passed 21 Directives and 2 Regulations. The re-
maining 6 Directives were initiated with some delay, but their circulation and adaptation for most
member-states took place before the end of our sample period (end of 2007). Unlike Regulations
that become enforceable immediately after their passage across all EU member states, Directives
have to be transposed within a certain period in the legal order of the member states. Usually the
transposition time takes a couple of years, as it entails various technical modications and adapta-
tions. European governments prefer Directives to Regulations, as they can delay the transposition
either for technical reasons (some countries need to change internal laws or/and create new insti-
tutions to incorporate the directive into national law), or for domestic policy considerations, such
as protecting local rms, shielding national industry interests, etc.15 Therefore, there is signicant
heterogeneity on the adaptation timing across countries, which is quite useful for our purposes.
T a b l e1g i v e st h et i t l e ,t h ed a t eo fc i r c u l a t i o nb yt h eE UC o m m i s s i o n ,a n dt h ed e a d l i n ef o r
the respective transposition for each of the 27 Directives of the FSAP. Supplementary Appendix
Table A provides a brief description of the context of each directive.16 While in our analysis we
do not distinguish between these legislative acts, it seems that the most important provisions for
investors were incorporated in the Prospectus Directive, the Market Abuse Directive, the Takeover
SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) and the STEP (Short-Term European Paper) platforms that aimed to integrate
payments in retail banking and bond markets (see Kalemli-Ozcan, Manganelli, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2009) for a
more-in-depth discussion). Since these electronic payment and settlement systems were introduced at the same time
in all euro area countries, one cannot isolate their impact from that of the elimination of the exchange rate variability.
15Numerous assessments conclude that this system of transposition was too slow, rigid, and failing to distinguish
between essential framework principles and implementing rules (see the so-called Lamfalussy report). The Takeovers
Directive, for example, had been discussed and negotiated at the EU level for 12 years. Likewise it took more than
30 years for EU governments to agree, vote, transpose and implement the European Company Statute Directive.
16All Supplementary Appendix Tables are available at: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~elias/research.html,
http://www.uh.edu/~skalemli/papers.html and http://sites.google.com/site/joseluispeydroswebpage/.16
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Bids Directive and the Transparency Directive (see Enriques and Gatti (2007)). Table 2 reports
the date of the transposition for each Directive across all EU15 member states. There is sizable
heterogeneity on the timing of the transposition across member states. Take for example the rst
Directive of the FSAP on Settlements that was circulated by the Commission in late 1998. Only
half of the EU-15 countries transposed the Directive in the following year. France, Luxemburg, and
Italy took three years to incorporate this Directive into national law. The transposition pace of the
Directive on the Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms
in a Financial Conglomerate was notoriously slow. Although the transposition mandate expired in
late 2004 (following an adoption time framework of two years), it was incorporated in time only by
four countries (namely Denmark, France, Finland and the UK). Most countries took ve years to
transpose this important nancial legislation into national law.
To create the bilateral harmonization variable (KDUPRQl>m>w)w erst dene twenty-seven
indicator variables that equal one starting at the year of the transposition of each directive into
national law in each country, and zero otherwise. Second, we construct a country-level time-
varying legal transposition measure ranging from zero to twenty-seven by summing up the values
of the indicator variables for each Directive (OH[l>w). Third, we construct the bilateral harmo-
nization index by taking the sum of the logs of one plus the legislation measure for each country
(i.e. KDUPRQl>m>w  ln(1 + OH[l>w) + ln(1 + OH[m>w)).17 For robustness we also construct the
KDUPRQ indicator using only the initial twenty-one Directives that were passed by the Com-
mission before the o!cial completion of the FSAP.
3R e s u l t s
3.1 Total Eect
Table 3 reports our results on the total (aggregate) eect of the euro on banking integration.18
Columns (1)-(2) of Panel A report unconditional estimates in the maximum sample of twenty
17For robustness we also used the product of the logs of the countries’ scores in transposition. We also simply
took the sum rather than the sum of the logs of the country measures of legislative harmonization, again nding
almost identical results. We prefer the logarithmic transformation because the harmonization variable is skewed. In
addition, since the dependent variable is also specied in logs this transformation makes the interpretation of the
coe!cients easier. We also estimated specications using a harmonization index that increases when both countries
in each country pair have transposed exactly the same Directive (see Supplementary Appendix Table I).
18To account for serial correlation and potentially for country-pair specic heteroskedasticity, standard errors are
clustered at the country-pair level (Bertrand et al. (2004)).17
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countries and thirty years with the stock and the  ow based measures of banking integration. The
coe!cient on H]2 is positive and statistically signicant at the 1% l e v e li nb o t hp e r m u t a t i o n s .
This indicates that bilateral banking activities among the euro area countries increased signicantly
after the adoption of the single currency. In contrast, the HX2 indicator enters with an insignicant
estimate. This suggests that it was the adoption of the single currency rather than being a member
of the EU that has contributed to the increase in nancial integration. The coe!cient on HX1
that equals one when one of the two counterparts is a member of the EU is negative and in most
models signicant at standard condence levels. This is due to the fact that cross-border banking
activities among the control group of countries (USA, Japan, Switzerland, Australia, and Canada)
is quite high, as many of these countries are important nancial centers. The coe!cient on H]1
that equals one when one of the two counterparts has adopted the euro is insignicant, suggesting
that the unilateral impact was much smaller than the bilateral eect.19
While in the specications reported in columns (1)-(2) we do not condition for other covari-
ates, the inclusion of country-pair xed-eects accounts for most of the usual control variables of
standard gravity equations of nancial  ows, such as distance, colonial ties, and land areas, all of
which have been shown to aect integration. In addition, the country-pair xed-eects account for
other hard-to-measure time-invariant bilateral factors that aect nancial linkages, such as trust,
cultural similarities, and information asymmetries. Gravity equations typically include the product
of bilateral GDPs in the set of explanatory variables. The main idea is that larger-richer economies
are able to attract more foreign investment, by providing a larger set of diversication opportunities
(e.g. Martin and Rey (2004)) and oering collateral (e.g. Gertler and Rogo (1990)). In columns
(3) and (4) we repeat estimation controlling for the log of the product of real per capita GDP of
the two countries in each year (using data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators data-
base). GDP is a signicant correlate of cross-border nancial holdings and transactions, even after
conditioning on country-pair unobservables and time trends. Yet the coe!cient on the indicator
that equals one when both counterparts are members of the euro area (H]2) remains signicant
at the 1% level.
In columns (5)-(8) we repeat the estimation, dropping observations from the late 1970s and
the 1980s. As cross-border banking activities increased drastically since the early 1990s, when the
19We also specied the HX1 and HX2 indicator variables in an alternative way. Specically we run models where the
HX1 and the HX2 dummies do not include the euro area countries. In these specications (reported in Supplementary
Appendix Table B) the coe!cient on the H]2 indicator is around 0=35 3 0=40.T h ec o e !cient on HX2 indicator is
also positive (around 0=58 3 0=70), although the estimate is not always statistically signicant. In contrast the HX1
and H]1 variables enter both with insignicant point estimates.18
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initial stages of the EMU were designed and implemented, it is important to explore the sensitivity
of our estimates in this dimension. In addition, focusing in the 1990s and the 2000s allows us to
examine the eects of the single currency with the same number of pre and post-1999 observations,
something always useful in before-after event studies. The estimate on the indicator that switches
to one when both countries join the euro area (H]2) is stable and remains highly signicant.
The most conservative estimate of the coe!cient on H]2 (in the specications where we also
control for GDP p.c.) implies that–compared to the general increase in banking integration in
the group of industrial economies–cross-border banking activities between the euro area countries
increased by 40%  45% after the adoption of the single currency (exp(0=35) = 1=41). While this
eect is large, it is smaller in magnitude than the estimates of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008),
Lane (2006a), de Santis and Gerard (2006) and Coeurdacier and Martin (2009), who, using IMF
survey data and cross-sectional approaches, estimate that the euro has increased bilateral equity
and bond holdings by around 100%, if not more. Our more conservative estimates stems from
the inclusion of country-pair xed-eects that accounts for all time-invariant bilateral factors that
aect nancial linkages. When we do not include country-pair xed-eects, we also nd signicantly
larger coe!cients. We similarly nd larger coe!cients when we simply control for country (rather
than country-pair) xed-eects or when we perform random eects estimation.
Yet, the interpretation of our within results is somewhat dierent than the cross-sectional
estimates. The coe!cient on H]2 in Table 2 measures the average increase in bilateral banking
activities in a pair of countries that has adopted the euro compared to the evolution of international
banking activities in the control group of countries. The cross-sectional estimates in contrast
measure how much larger are nancial linkages of the euro area countries compared to that of other
economies in the post-1999 period.
The average bilateral eect of the euro on cross-border banking activities reported in Panel A of
Table 3 is also lower than the estimates of Spiegel (2009a,b), who, using BIS consolidated banking
statistics for Portugal and Greece over the period 1985  2006, nds that the single currency
increased banking activities three-fold. Besides the dierent sample period, the main reason for
this dierence is the extent of the data. Spiegel (2009a,b) focuses on two small euro area countries,
while we investigate the impact of the single currency in all twelve initial members of the euro
area.20 We thus explored whether the impact of the single currency was larger for small euro area
20While we include in the specication country-pair xed-eects to account for all time-invariant country-pair
factors, Spiegel (2009a,b) includes source-country and recipient-country xed-eects and directly controls for bilateral
gravity factors (such as distance and common language). When we replace the country-pair xed-eects with country19
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countries compared to large economies. The estimates (not reported for brevity) are similar for
the two group of countries (small and large) and almost identical to the coe!cient reported in
Panel A of Table 3.21 Our results on the bilateral euro eect is also in line (though a bit more
conservative) with the estimates of Blank and Buch (2007), who nd that the euro increased cross-
border bank assets and liabilities by around 80% and 35% respectively. While these authors also
estimate country-pair xed-eect models using a similar dataset, their panel just covers ve pre
and ve post 1999 observations. Our much larger time-dimension allows us to better account for
trends in both the control and the treatment group of countries.
Panel B of Table 3 reports results of otherwise similar to Panel A specications, estimated
only in the EU15 sub-sample. Although in Panel A we control for both unilateral and bilateral
eects of EU membership, one may worry that there are dierent dynamics in the EU and the
larger group of industrial countries. To account for this, we re-estimated the specications in the
EU15 sample. The coe!cient on the indicator that switches to one for the twelve countries that
adopted the single currency after 1999 remains statistically dierent than zero in all permutations.
This reassures that (the more e!cient) estimates in the full sample of countries do not re ect an
EU-wide eect or dierent patterns in cross-border banking activities in the EU. The coe!cient
drops somewhat, implying that banking activities among the euro area countries increased by 25%
(exp(0=210=25)1 = 23%29%), compared to the evolution of banking integration in the three
European countries that have opted out of the currency union.
3.2 Channels
We now investigate the role of the exchange rate regime, harmonization policies in nancial services,
and trade on nancial integration. This allows us to understand the underlying reasons for the total
eect of the euro documented in Table 3. We start examining the eect of each channel. We then
simultaneously control for all of these factors. Finally, we explore the sensitivity of our results.
Exchange rate risk The most immediate eect of the euro was to eliminate currency risk among
member countries. Even before 1999 exchange rate  uctuations among the legacy currencies were
limited. One of the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that set the rules for monetary union
was that member countries had to join the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II) for two consecutive
xed-eects the coe!cient on the indicator variable that takes on the value one when both countries are euro area
members retains signicance and becomes signicantly larger, much closer to Spiegel’s estimate.
21We thank Mark Spiegel for proposing this robustness check.20
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years without devaluating its currency during the period. Yet, although exchange rate variability
was lower for European countries participating in the ERM in the nineties than in previous years,
foreign investors still had to bear a risk of an abrupt misalignment or a currency attack (as for
example in the UK in September of 1992, in France in early 1993, or in Spain in 1992 and 1993).
To investigate the eect of exchange rate variability risk, in columns (1)-(2) of Table 4 we
augment the baseline specication with the bilateral exchange rate  exibility measure, HU
i
l>m>w,b a s e d
on "ne" classication of Reinhart and Rogo (2004).22 The coe!cient on the variable that re ects
the bilateral  exibility of the exchange rate regime is negative and signicant at the 1% condence
level.23 This suggests that banking activities have increased signicantly among pairs of countries
that have adopted more rigid currency regimes. This nding ts with the evidence from the "fear
of  oating" literature (e.g. Calvo and Reinhart (2002); Klein and Shambaugh (2008); Gelos and
Wei (2005)). This research argues that in order to attract foreign capital, emerging economies are
unwilling to let their currencies  oat; and even when monetary authorities in developing countries
argue that they do not manage the currency in practice they do so (Reinhart and Rogo (2004)).
While this body of work focuses on developing economies, our panel evidence in Table 4 shows a
similar pattern across developed countries.
In addition to its direct eect on integration, controlling for exchange rate  exibility also makes
the coe!cient on the indicator variable that equals one when the two countries are members of
t h ee u r oa r e a( H]2l>m>w) insignicant. While in some perturbations (reported below in Table 5) the
estimate on the H]2 retains signicance, this is only at 10%  20%. In addition the estimate falls
considerably even when it is signicant. This suggests that the positive eect of the single currency
mainly comes from the elimination of currency risk.
Legislative Harmonization The euro was supported by various legislative and regulatory har-
monization policies in nancial services. Although some reforms occurred before 1999 (mainly with
the adoption of the First and the Second Banking Directive), European banking markets remained
fragmented till the eve of the monetary union (e.g. Hartmann et al. (2003)). The main objective of
the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) was to tackle this issue and with its various legislative
acts to create a single liquid nancial market (e.g. Enriques and Gatti (2007)).
22Since the product of log GDP p.c. enters always with a highly signicant coe!cient, we always include it in the
specications. The results are similar if we drop this variable from the estimation.
23We also estimated models using the sum of the exchange rate grid of the two countries. The results are similar.
We also used the product of the logs of the two countries’ classication score. The bilateral exchange rate regime
index enters always with a negative and signicant estimate.21
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In columns (3)-(4) of Table 4, we augment the baseline specication with our newly constructed
harmonization index (KDUPRQl>m>w) that sums the log number of the transposed Directives of
the FSAP across the two countries (OH[) in each year. We remove (for the time) the exchange
rate regime index from the set of explanatory variables, since we want to investigate the role of
each channel one at a time. The coe!cient on KDUPRQ is positive and signicant at the 1%
level. This implies that legislative and regulatory harmonization policies in nancial services had
as i g n i cant positive eect on cross-border banking integration. As we control for EU and euro
area membership (with the four indicator variables), the signicantly positive estimates on the
bilateral harmonization index suggests that legislative harmonization in nancial markets also had
a rst-order eect on cross-border banking integration that works on top of the general positive
eect of the euro area membership.
Once we control for legislative-regulatory policies among the EU-members states, the coe!cient
on the indicator variable that equals one when both counterparts are members of the Eurozone,
H]2, drops compared to the unconditional estimates (in Table 3). It retains signicance though (at
the 10%). This suggests that while nancial sector harmonization policies did boost cross-border
banking activities, the eect of the euro on integration goes only partially through legislative
harmonization in nancial services.
The signicant correlation between legislative harmonization and nancial integration reveal
that legal system dierences may explain the lack of international diversication. The empirical
literature on law and nance shows that country-level dierences in investor protection can explain
a sizable portion of the size of domestic nancial markets (see La Porta et al. (2008) for a review).
Our results contribute to this body of work by showing that legal harmonization has also an eect on
bilateral nancial linkages and can thus explain the lack of cross-border investment (see Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2003) for a theoretical exposition). Most likely the eect of legislative harmonization
policies in nancial services is larger than our estimates suggest, since our index contains some
measurement error. The transposition of the Directives into the domestic legal order diers to
some extent across the EU. Some countries for example implement stricter regulatory practices
than the ones specied in each Directive, while other countries go for minimum harmonization (see
Enriques and Gatti (2007) for a detailed analysis). Moreover some Directives leave considerable
room to member states for modications, exemptions, and partial implementation (as for example
the Takeover Bids Directive), while other Directives are quite comprehensive detailing all necessary
ingredients of domestic legislation (as for example the Market Abuse Directive and to a lesser
extent the Prospectus Directive). Most importantly, actual enforcement of the EU legislation22
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diers considerably across the EU (e.g. Djankov et al. (2003, 2008)) and thus the de-facto impact
of the transposition might also be dierent than the de-jure eect that our estimates re ect.
Trade Are trade in goods and trade in assets complements or substitutes? While it is quite chal-
lenging to establish causation, ample studies show a strong correlation between trade and nancial
integration (see for example Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007)). A volumious literature also shows that
t h ee u r oh a dap o s i t i v ee ect on goods trade.24 Thus, another potential channel explaining the
spur in nancial integration among the euro area countries compared to other developed economies
could stem from increased trade in goods. To account for this channel, in columns (5) and (6) of
T a b l e4 ,w ea u g m e n tt h eb a s e l i n es p e c i cation with the average of the log of bilateral exports and
imports as a share of the two countries’ population (WUDGHl>m>w), using data from IMF’s Direction
of Trade Database.25
The coe!cient on WUDGHl>m>w is positive and signicant, suggesting that trade in goods and
bank claims go in tandem (e.g. Rose and Spiegel (2004) and Rose (2005)). Compared to the
previous literature our results demonstrate that the strong trade-nance nexus is present even
when we control for country-pair xed-eects and global trends. Yet, trade linkages cannot explain
the total impact of the euro on integration at all. The coe!cient on the H]2 indicator in columns
(5)-(6) is quite similar to the analogous estimates in Table 3. In addition the estimates remain
statistically signicant at the 1% level. Thus while trade is a signicant correlate of nancial
integration, it can not account for the large eect of monetary union documented in Table 3.
All channels There is a possibility that each channel is proxying one another. Thus, in Table 5
we augment the specication with all three variables that capture the exchange rate channel, the
legislative harmonization policies in nancial markets, and trade. We also explore the sensitivity
of our results by presenting results with the alternative exchange rate index (HUf) based on the
"coarse" regime classication (in columns (5)-(8)) and the harmonization index (KDUPRQ)u s i n g
only the initial 21 Directives of the FSAP (in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8)). As we lose 15% of
our sample when we control for trade (due to some gaps on IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics),
24While initial (cross-sectional) studies document an (unrealistically) high eect (e.g. Rose (2000)), recent (panel)
studies estimate that the single currency increased bilateral trade approximately by 8% 3 14% (e.g. Flam and
Nordstrom (2008)).
25We also experiment with other measures of trade, such as the (log and the level) of average bilateral exports and
imports as a share of GDP, nding similar results.23
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in Table 6 we report otherwise identical to Table 5 specications, but without trade in the RHS.26
The HU index that sums (the log) of the exchange rate regime index of the two countries
enters with a negative coe!cient in all permutations of Tables 5 and 6. The coe!cient drops by
20%  50% compared to the estimates in columns (1)-(2) of Table 4, where we didn’t control for
legislative harmonization policies in nancial services and trade. Yet the estimate is statistically
signicant in all but two of the sixteen specications. Turning now to the eect of legislative
harmonization policies in nancial markets, the results in Tables 5 and 6 show that the FSAP
had a signicantly positive impact on spurring cross-border banking activities across Europe. In
all specications the harmonization index enters with a coe!cient that is at least two standard
errors above zero. The estimate (around 0=070=09) is also quite similar to the more parsimonious
specications in columns (3)-(4) of Table 4. As we control for exchange rate  uctuations, GDP
dierences, and trade, this result is encouraging for European policy makers, who are in the process
of further promoting legislative and regulatory harmonization in nancial markets. Trade continues
to enter with a signicantly positive elasticity. As long as the estimate is not driven exclusively by
reverse causation, this suggests that besides more immediate eects, the euro could speed nancial
integration indirectly through goods market integration.
To get an estimate of the relative importance of the three channels we also estimated stan-
dardized beta coe!cients. The average value of the beta coe!cient for the bilateral exchange rate
index in Table 5 is 0=06. This implies that a one standard deviation fall in HU that makes the
exchange rate regime more rigid is associated with a 0=06 increase in the dependent variable. The
average value of the standardized coe!cient for the bilateral harmonization index (KDUPRQ)i s
somewhat larger, 0=075, while trade’s beta coe!cient is on average 0=14.
In almost all perturbations in Tables 5 and 6 the coe!cient on H]2 turns insignicant. Even
in the specications that the estimate retains signicance, this is borderline and the coe!cient
drops considerably compared to the unconditional estimates in Table 3. Combined with the results
in Table 4, the elimination of exchange rate risk seems to be the most important channel. Yet,
legislative harmonization policies in nancial services have also crucially contributed to the spur of
cross-border nancial linkages across the EU in the past decade. In contrast goods trade, while a
highly signicant correlate of banking integration (with the largest "standardized" coe!cient), is
26Supplementary Appendix Table C reports analogous specications but with an alternative way to specify the
four EU and EZ indicator variables. In these specications the HX1 and the HX2 dummies do not include the euro
area countries.24
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not behind the large unconditional eect of the single currency documented in Table 3.27
Sensitivity Analysis We explored extensively the sensitivity of our results. As already shown
in Table 3 we estimated the specications only in the 1990s and the 2000s to account for potentially
die r e n td y n a m i c si nt h et w os u b - p e r i o d s . M o r e o v e r ,a st h er e s u l t si nT a b l e s5a n d6s h o wo u r
results are not sensitive to dierent ways measuring the nature of the exchange rate regime or the
legislative harmonization policies of the FSAP.
In Table 7 we check whether the results are driven by Luxemburg and Switzerland, the two
countries with the largest share of foreign bank asstes and liabilities in our sample.28 Columns
(1)-(4) report simple specications (analogous to the models in Table 3) that estimate the total
eect of the single currency on banking integration. The coe!cient on the indicator variable that
takes on the value one when both countries are members of the euro area retains its economic
and statistical signicance. The most conservative estimate in column (4) implies that following
the adoption of the euro cross-border banking activities by approximately 50%, compared to the
general increase in the other industrial economies (exp(0=402) = 1=49) .Y e to n c ew ec o n t r o lf o rt h e
nature of the exchange rate regime and legislative harmonization (in (5)-(6)) the estimate on H]2
turns insignicant as in our previously reported results; and although trade in goods is correlated
with banking activities (column (7)-(8)), this cannot account for the eect of single currency on
nancial integration.
In Table 8 we control for structural features of the domestic banking system in countries l and
m. This is a necessary robustness check as there is concern that the implementation of the FSAP
directives was driven by local conditions in the banking system.29 We do so using three time-
varying proxies of bank’s health and protability from the latest update of World Bank’s Financial
Structure Database (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000)). In columns (1)-(2) we control for
banks’ overhead costs, while in (3)-(4) we control for banks’ protability using the average value
of banks’ net interest revenue as a share of total assets (the Data Appendix gives detailed variable
denitions). Both measures of banking performance enter with insignicant estimates. In (5)-(6)
we control for competition in the banking system with a concentration index that equals the share
27This is not to say that other policies and reforms did not have any eect. The EMU project included many
policies that are hard-to-precisely pin down and measure. See Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2009) for a detailed summary
of the technical and infrastructure steps that the EU bodies have taken to homogenize the various market segments
for nancial services.
28The results are similar if we exclude only Luxemburg or only Switzerland or if we also drop the United Kingdom.
29We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.25
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of the assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks. The coe!cient is
indistinguishable from zero. More importantly, controlling for structural features of the banking
system has no eect on our main results. Cross-border banking activities increase signicantly
when countries adopt more rigid exchange rate arrangements (such as joining the euro). Moreover,
international nancial linkages are stronger among countries with more similar legal and regulatory
rules in nancial services.
We have performed many other sensitivity checks:30 First, to partly account for reverse causa-
tion we have run regressions using lagged values of all explanatory variables (see Supplementary
Appendix Table D). We have also estimated 2SLS specications using lagged trade as an instrument
for contemporaneous trade (see Supplementary Appendix Table E). The results are quite robust
and the estimates unaected. Second, we have also analyzed assets and liabilities separately, as
there is always a possibility that the euro might have aected them dierently. The regressions
(reported on Supplementary Appendix Table F) show similar patterns. Third, we also controlled
for a bilateral measure of nominal exchange rate volatility (following Devereux and Lane (2003)).
Again all our results are robust to the inclusion of this control, which (as in Lane (2006a)) ap-
p e a r sw i t ha ni n s i g n i cant coe!cient (Supplementary Appendix Table G). The insignicant eect
of nominal exchange rate volatility suggests that foreign banks were particularly concerned with
currency risk rather than with (relatively small) swings in the exchange rate. Fourth, we used an
alternative legislative harmonization index in nancial services that changes when the two coun-
tries have adopted exactly the same Directive. The results (reported in Supplementary Appendix
H) are unchanged and if anything stronger. Finally, although the universal banking structure in
Europe (see Allen et al. (2004)) implies that all the FSAP directives are relevant for banks, we
also specied a banking legislative harmonization measure that only re ects the Directives that are
relatively more relevant to banking (i.e. excluding those ones which are relatively more important
for security and insurance markets) nding similar results (Supplementary Appendix Table I).31
30All Supplementary Appendix Tables with the additional sensitivity checks are available at:
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~elias.
31In particular, in Supplementary Appendix Table I we use the directives numbered 2, 5, 8, 14, 19, 26 and 27 of
Table 1. This follows the recent Commission study on the evaluation of the FSAP by Malcolm, Tilden and Wilsdon
(2009)). We are grateful to Ana Margarida Monteiro, and the other experts of the ECB Financial Law department
for clarifying these issues.26
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4C o n c l u s i o n
The introduction of the euro has been one of the most important policy experiments in international
economics over the past decades. The initial focus of the literature was to investigate the eect of the
euro on trade integration. Following the development of new datasets on cross-border investment,
recent studies examine the euro’s impact on nancial integration, documenting a large eect. Yet,
we still do not know the exact mechanism through which the euro aects nancial integration. This
is the main task we undertook in this paper.
We construct a new dataset of legislative-regulatory harmonization policies in nancial inter-
mediation across the European Union in the last decade and then merge it with the condential
version of BIS’s Locational Banking Statistics that records bilateral nancial linkages among twenty
industrial countries in the past thirty years. The rich panel structure allows us to reassess the euro’s
impact on nancial integration accounting for all time-invariant country-pair factors, such as trust,
culture, and information frictions.
First, our "within" before-after analysis shows that while the total eect of the euro on nancial
integration is highly signicant, it is quantitatively much smaller from what has been reported in
the previous studies that relied on cross-sectional approaches and data covering the last decade.
Second, our "channels" analysis shows that the euro’s impact is primarily driven by the elim-
ination of currency risk across member countries. We also document that legislative-regulatory
harmonization policies in nancial markets, albeit far from perfect (Enriques and Gatti (2007),
have contributed signicantly to the spur of cross-border lending and investment across Europe;
these integration reforms therefore explain a sizable portion of the aggregate eect of the euro. In
contrast, while goods trade is a signicant correlate of cross-border lending, it can not explain the
euro’s large impact on nancial integration.
Our results have some straightforward policy implications. The fact that legislative-regulatory
harmonization policies have a direct eect on nancial integration on top of all the other channels
and country/time factors is quite encouraging for European policy makers, who are currently in
the process of promoting further harmonization. Future research should investigate the eect of
such legislative reforms on other aspects of integration, such as cross-border M&A activity, vertical
and horizontal FDI, outsourcing, return co-movement, and risk-taking by banks.27
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1216
June 2010
5D a t a A p p e n d i x
B a n k i n gI n t e g r a t i o n1[ EL1]: Banking integration index based on bilateral cross-border holdings
(stocks) of banks. Data on bank’s cross-border bilateral stocks of assets and liabilities come from
the condential version of BIS’s Locational Banking Statistics. For each country-pair and year
there are up to four observations. i) asset holdings (stocks) of banks located in country l in all
sectors of the economy in country m; ii) asset holdings (stocks) of banks located in country m in
all sectors of the economy in country l; iii) liabilities (stocks) of banks located in country l to
country m. iv) liabilities (stocks) of banks located in country m to country l. The data is originally
expressed in current US dollars. First, we de ate the four series with the US de ator. Second, we
standardize the series by dividing asset and liabilities with the sum of the two countries population
in each year (using data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database). Third, we
take the average of the log value of real bilateral assets and liabilities in each year. Source: Bank
of International Settlements, Locational Banking Statistics (2008).
Banking Integration 2 [EL2]: Banking integration index based on bilateral cross-border
gross  ows of banks. Data on bank’s cross-border bilateral gross  ows of assets and liabilities come
from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics. For each country-pair and year there are up to four
observations. i)a s s e t ows of banks located in country l in all sectors of the economy in country m;
ii)a s s e t ows of banks located in country m in all sectors of the economy in country l; iii)l i a b i l i t y
 ows of banks located in country l to country m. iv)l i a b i l i t y ows of banks located in country m to
country l. The data is originally expressed in current US dollars. First we de ate the four series
with the US de ator. Second we take the absolute value of (net)  ows. Third, we standardize the
series, by dividing asset and liability  ows with the sum of the two countries population in each
year (using data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database). Fourth, we take the
average of the log value of real bilateral gross  ows in assets and liabilities in each year. Source:
Bank of International Settlements, Locational Banking Statistics (2008).
Euro Area Both [H]2]: Bilateral index of membership in the euro area. The measure is an
indicator variable that takes on the value one if both countries are members of the euro-zone in
year w and zero otherwise. Source: European Central Bank.
Euro Area One [H]1]: Bilateral index of membership in the euro area. The measure is an
indicator variable that takes on the value one if only one country is member of the euro-zone in
year w and zero otherwise. Source: European Central Bank.28
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European Union Both [HX2]: Bilateral index of membership in the EU. The measure is an
indicator variable that takes on the value one if both countries are members of the EU in year w
and zero otherwise. Source: EU Commission.
European Union One [HX1]: Bilateral index of membership in the EU. The measure is an
indicator variable that takes on the value one if only one country is member of the EU in year w
and zero otherwise. Source: EU Commission.
Exchange Rate Flexibility [HU]: Bilateral index of the  exibility of the exchange rate,
based either on the "ne" or "coarse" regime classication of Reinhart and Rogo (2004). In the
"ne" classication the country-specic index ranges from 1 to 14 where lower values suggest a more
rigid regime, whereas in the "coarse" classication the index ranges from 1 to 5.W ec o n s t r u c tt h e
bilateral index by taking the sum of the log classication of countries l and m in the beginning
(January) of each year w (HUl>m>w =l n ( HUl>w) + ln(HUm>w)). Source: Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogo
(2008) and Reinhart and Rogo (2004).
Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility [HUYRO]: Standard deviation of the log rst dierence
of the monthly bilateral exchange rate for each year over the period 1978  2007. YR O HU l m =
VWGHYw[ln(hl>m>p)] where hl>m>p is the monthly nominal exchange rate between countries l and
m. The index follows Devereux and Lane (2003). Source: ECB.
Legislative Harmonization in Financial Services [KDUPRQ]: Index of regulatory-
legislative harmonization in nancial services based on the transposition of the Directives of the
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). The FSAP was launched in 1998 and included 27 EU-
wide legislative acts (the Directives) that require from member countries to transpose in due time
to the domestic legal order. Until the o!cial completion of the plan in the end of 2003, the
EU legislative bodies (the Commission and the Council) had initiated 21 of these laws. The
remaining 6 Directives were initiated before the end of our sample and thus we include them in our
analysis. However, Directives do not become immediately enforceable across the EU. EU member
states have considerable discretion in the transposition (adoption) of these acts. We construct the
bilateral harmonization index in three steps. First, for each country we dene 27@21 indicator
variables that equal one starting at the year of the transposition of each Directive into national
law and zero otherwise. Second, we create a country-time varying legislation measure ranging from
0 to 27@21 by summing the values of the 27@21 indicator variables for each country (OH[l>w).
Third, we take the sum of the log value of the legislation measure for each country in each year
(i.e. KDUPRQl>m>w  ln(1+OH[l>w)+l n ( 1+OH[m>w)). The data is retrieved from the EU29
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Commission’s league tables (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/nances/index_en.htm). The
Commission also provides links to the national legislative acts of the EU15 member countries. We
were thus able to track down the exact timing of national legislative acts that transposed the
Directives. Source: EU Commission League Tables.
Alternative Legislative Harmonization in Financial Services [KDUPRQDOW]: Al-
ternative index of regulatory-legislative harmonization in nancial services based on the transpo-
sition of the Directives of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). The index is constructed
in two steps. First, for each country-pair we dene 27 indicator variables. Each dummy variable
(OH[  DOWl>>m>w) equals one starting at the year of the transposition of each Directive into na-
tional law by both countries and zero otherwise. Second, we we create the alternative legislative
harmonization measure by summing the values of these 27 indicator variables (OH[  DOWl>>m>w).






. The results with this index are reported in
Supplementary Appendix Table H. Source: EU Commission League Tables.
Banking Legislative Harmonization in Financial Services [KDUPRQEDQN]: The
index of legislative harmonization policies in banking is based on the Directives of the the Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP). Using the classication of the Directives into banking, insurance, and
capital markets (from Malcolm, Tilden, and Wilsdon (2009)) we construct this measure similarly
to the KDUPRQ index, but we use information only on the seven Directives that were more
relevant for banking activities. These Directives are numbered 2, 5, 8, 14, 19, 26 and 27 in Tables
1 and 2. See also Supplementary Appendix Table A. The results with this index are reported in
Supplementary Appendix Table I. Source: EU Commission League Tables.
Trade [WUDGH]: Index of bilateral trade intensity/integration. The measure is the log of
bilateral real (de ated with the US price de ator) exports and imports as a share of two country’s
population. Source: IMF’s Direction of Trade Database (2008).
Real Per Capita GDP [JGS]: Index of the economic importance of the two countries. The
measure is the log of the product of real per capita GDP of the two countries in each year. Source:
World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database (2008).
Bank Net Interest Margin [PDUJLQ]: Accounting value of bank’s net interest revenue as
a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets. Source: Financial Structure Database, Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000). Original Source: Fitch’s BankScope Database.
Bank Overhead Costs [RYHUKHDG]: Accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as a
share of its total assets. Source: Financial Structure Database, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine30
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(2000). Original Source: Fitch’s BankScope Database.
Bank Concentration Index [FRQFHQWUDWLRQ]: Assets of three largest banks as a
share of assets of all commercial banks. Source: Financial Structure Database, Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (2000). Original Source: Fitch’s BankScope Database.31
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Working Paper Series No 1216
June 2010
BI1-Stocks BI2-Flows BI1-Stocks BI2-Flows BI1-Stocks BI2-Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
euone (EU1) -0.4337 -0.3020 -0.4661 -0.3239 -0.6409 -0.4527
  t-stat  (2.91)  (2.50)  (3.27)  (2.75)  (4.46)  (3.84)
euboth (EU2) -0.0684 0.1242 -0.0882 0.1001 -0.0733 0.1249
  t-stat  (0.53) (1.23)  (0.70) (1.02)  (0.57) (1.23)
euroone (EZ1) -0.8097 -0.5265 -0.4089 -0.2596 -0.2799 -0.1480
  t-stat  (4.42)  (3.31)  (2.64)  (1.79)  (1.82)  (1.02)
euroboth (EZ2) -0.1504 -0.0104 0.2426 0.2503 0.3256 0.3125
  t-stat  (1.04)  (0.08) (1.71) (2.27) (2.59) (3.18)
Exchange Rate  (ER) -0.2828 -0.2007
  t-stat  (4.52)  (3.66)
Financial Legislation (HARMON) 0.1075 0.0951
  t-stat (2.90) (2.95)
Trade (TRADE) 0.2618 0.1878
  t-stat (3.75) (3.09)
Real p.c. GDP 3.1393 2.1783 3.0307 2.0914 3.7237 2.6419
  t-stat (8.72) (8.36) (7.92) (7.55) (11.57) (10.77)
Observations 5566 5566 5566 5566 4882 4882
Within R-squared 0.606 0.618 0.599 0.616 0.668 0.653
Country-pairs 190 190 190 190 190 190
The Table reports panel fixed-effect estimates. All specifications include year fixed-effects and country-pair fixed-effects. In odd-
numbered columns, the dependent variable (banking integration) is the average of the log of real bilateral assets and liabilities
holdings of banks in countries i and j in year t, standardized by the sum of the two countries' population in each year (BI1). In even-
numbered columns, the dependent variable (banking integration) is the average of the log of real bilateral gross flows in assets and 
liabilities of banks in countries i and j in year t, standardized by the sum of the two countries' population in each year (BI2).
EU1 is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if only one counterpart in each pair of countries is member of the EU in
year t and zero otherwise. EU2 is an indicator variable that takes on the value one if both countries are members of the EU in year t
and zero otherwise. EZ1 is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if only one counterpart in each pair of countries is 
member of the euro area in year t and zero otherwise. EZ2 is an indicator variable that takes on the value one if both countries are 
members of the euro area in year t and zero otherwise. Real p.c. GDP  is the log of the product of real per capita GDP of the two 
countries in year t. Exchange Rate is a bilateral time-varying measure of the flexibility of the exchange rate regime (based on the 
“fine” classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)). Financial Legislation is a bilateral
time-varying measure of legislative and regulatory harmonization policies in financial services based on the transposition of the 27 
Directives Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). Trade is the log of real imports and exports as a share of the two countries' GDP. 
The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. t-statistics based on country-pair specific (clustered) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are reported in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates. The Table also reports the number
of country-pairs, the number of observations, and the within R-squared.
Table 4: Euro Membership, Exchange Rate Regime, and Banking Integration
Panel Fixed-Effects Estimates
Exchange Rate Regime Legislative Harmonization Trade41
ECB





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1216
June 2010
Banking Characteristic
BI1-Stocks BI2-Flows BI1-Stocks BI2-Flows BI1-Stocks BI2-Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
euone (EU1) -0.4600 -0.4937 -0.4471 -0.4775 -0.4558 -0.4878
  t-stat  (2.74)  (3.29)  (2.71)  (3.19)  (2.77)  (3.30)
euboth (EU2) -0.1843 -0.0387 -0.1661 -0.0289 -0.1791 -0.0408
  t-stat  (1.49)  (0.39)  (1.37)  (0.29)  (1.48)  (0.41)
euroone (EZ1) -0.7188 -0.4360 -0.6746 -0.4172 -0.6869 -0.4225
  t-stat  (4.55)  (3.17)  (4.32)  (3.02)  (4.36)  (3.05)
euroboth (EZ2) -0.1193 0.0519 -0.0883 0.0626 -0.1045 0.0526
  t-stat  (0.90) (0.49)  (0.66) (0.58)  (0.79) (0.48)
Exchange Rate (ER) -0.2781 -0.1659 -0.2592 -0.1581 -0.2626 -0.1602
  t-stat  (4.63)  (2.97)  (4.35)  (2.81)  (4.43)  (2.88)
Financial Legislation (HARMON) 0.0657 0.0477 0.0677 0.0493 0.0781 0.0575
  t-stat (2.34) (1.81) (2.43) (1.91) (2.93) (2.32)
Trade (TRADE) 0.0430 0.0395 0.0335 0.0340 0.0334 0.0338
  t-stat (0.75) (0.79) (0.59) (0.68) (0.58) (0.68)
Real p.c. GDP (GDP) 2.6301 1.8637 2.3856 1.6479 2.3608 1.6352
  t-stat (6.98) (6.11) (6.20) (5.25) (6.11) (5.27)
Banking Characteristic Country i -0.0890 0.0778 0.9594 -0.2890 4.6699 4.4691
  t-stat  (0.59) (0.51) (1.02)  (0.25) (1.24) (1.19)
Banking Characteristic Country j 0.0775 0.0866 1.6263 0.5172 -0.4615 -1.5221
  t-stat (0.54) (0.68) (0.74) (0.28)  (0.17)  (0.55)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2958 2959 2942 2943 2942 2943
Within R-squared 0.4592 0.432 0.4359 0.4164 0.4364 0.4176
Country-pairs 190 190 190 190 190 190
Table 8: Euro Membership, Exchange Rate Regime, and Banking Integration
Controlling for Structural Characteristics of the Banking System
Bank Concentration Bank Overhead Costs Bank Interest Margin47
ECB
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